Defeat is an orphan
The United States' defeat in the Vietnam war started becoming evident when Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, started using body counts as an alternative to military victories. When he could not point to achievements on the battlefield, Westmoreland would send a daily report to Washington of the number of Vietcong soldiers his forces had killed.
In the past few weeks, the Israel Defense Forces has also adopted the body count approach. When the largest and strongest army in the Middle East clashes for more than two weeks with 50 Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbail and does not bring them to their knees, the commanders are left with no choice but to point to the number of dead fighters the enemy has left behind. It can be assumed that Bint Jbail will turn into a symbol of the second Lebanon war. For the Hezbollah fighters it will be remembered as their Stalingrad, and for us it will be a painful reminder of the IDF's defeat.
Reuven Pedatzur's column in today's Ha'aretz newspaper is one of the best pieces on Israel's recent humiliation that I have read.
It seems to me that If Israel had rolled over for Hezbollah back in July and simply turned over imprisoned Hezbollah terrorists in return for getting its two kidnapped soldiers back, the worst possible consequences of such an action would not have been as bad as things actually turned out. Hezbollah won. They are more powerful now then they were before the war. Syria and Iran are emboldened (and the latter will soon have nukes, and may feel even more confident now to threaten to use them). And inside Israel, recriminations are flowing, the government is teetering and the latest revelation is that the head of the military reacted to the outbreak of war last month by running off and selling all his Israeli assets.
In nearly 60 years of existance, Israel has never had a war turn out as disastrous as the recent conflict with Hezbollah. It was amazing to see such a complete lack of strategic and tactical thinking combined with inept and tone-deaf leadership from Israel. They seemed completely unready to face a tough, dug-in and mentally and physically prepared enemy fighting with modern weapons. Maybe the Israeli army has grown soft after 20 years of occupying Palestinian areas and taking on inept Palestinian terrorists and guerillas.
The only saving grace was that this war, unlike earlier wars, at least didn't have as the consequence of losing the end of the Israeli state. But the next one might, and Israel needs to get back the military that existed in 1948 and 1956 and 1967 and 1973, and re-learn some old lessons: gather good intelligence, expect a tough, well-prepared enemy. Air power doesn't win wars on its own. Fight all-out or do not fight. Do not neglect diplomacy, psychological factors, or media relations. And most of all, win.
The United States' defeat in the Vietnam war started becoming evident when Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, started using body counts as an alternative to military victories. When he could not point to achievements on the battlefield, Westmoreland would send a daily report to Washington of the number of Vietcong soldiers his forces had killed.
In the past few weeks, the Israel Defense Forces has also adopted the body count approach. When the largest and strongest army in the Middle East clashes for more than two weeks with 50 Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbail and does not bring them to their knees, the commanders are left with no choice but to point to the number of dead fighters the enemy has left behind. It can be assumed that Bint Jbail will turn into a symbol of the second Lebanon war. For the Hezbollah fighters it will be remembered as their Stalingrad, and for us it will be a painful reminder of the IDF's defeat.
Reuven Pedatzur's column in today's Ha'aretz newspaper is one of the best pieces on Israel's recent humiliation that I have read.
It seems to me that If Israel had rolled over for Hezbollah back in July and simply turned over imprisoned Hezbollah terrorists in return for getting its two kidnapped soldiers back, the worst possible consequences of such an action would not have been as bad as things actually turned out. Hezbollah won. They are more powerful now then they were before the war. Syria and Iran are emboldened (and the latter will soon have nukes, and may feel even more confident now to threaten to use them). And inside Israel, recriminations are flowing, the government is teetering and the latest revelation is that the head of the military reacted to the outbreak of war last month by running off and selling all his Israeli assets.
In nearly 60 years of existance, Israel has never had a war turn out as disastrous as the recent conflict with Hezbollah. It was amazing to see such a complete lack of strategic and tactical thinking combined with inept and tone-deaf leadership from Israel. They seemed completely unready to face a tough, dug-in and mentally and physically prepared enemy fighting with modern weapons. Maybe the Israeli army has grown soft after 20 years of occupying Palestinian areas and taking on inept Palestinian terrorists and guerillas.
The only saving grace was that this war, unlike earlier wars, at least didn't have as the consequence of losing the end of the Israeli state. But the next one might, and Israel needs to get back the military that existed in 1948 and 1956 and 1967 and 1973, and re-learn some old lessons: gather good intelligence, expect a tough, well-prepared enemy. Air power doesn't win wars on its own. Fight all-out or do not fight. Do not neglect diplomacy, psychological factors, or media relations. And most of all, win.
posted by Mike at
9:40 AM
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